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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

5

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

$

MARK DERON HARRISON,

I

Case No- 890617-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of a second degree
felony in the Third District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f)(1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Should this Court uphold the lower court's

rejection of defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory
challenges because it was untimely or because defendant did not
make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor had exercised his
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner?
Objections to the jury must be made prior to the time the jury is
sworn.

State v. Bankhead# 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986).

To

attack a peremptory challenge exercised by the prosecutor, the
defendant must first establish a prima facie case.

State? v.

Cantu, 750 P.2d 581, 595 (Utah 1988).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it

excluded as irrelevant evidence of unconnected gang violcmce

offered by defendant?

The trial court has considerable

discretion in deciding whether evidence is relevant.
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976).

Bambrough

The decision of the

trial court to exclude evidence will not be reversed absent abuse
of that discretion-

Terry v. ZCMIy 605 P.2d 314, 323 (Utah

1979).
3.

Was there prosecutorial misconduct during closing

arguments that prejudiced defendant?

It is not prosecutor

misconduct to bring to the jurors' attention matters which they
are justified in considering? and a case will not be reversed for
prosecutor misconduct absent prejudice.

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d

483f 486 (Utah 1984).
4.

Did the trial court err in finding that defendant's

fourth amendment rights were not violated by the search of a
diaper bag in joint possession of defendant and his wife who were
both arrested at the time of the search?

The appellate court

applies a correction of error standard to the legal conclusions
of the trial court regarding search and seizure questions.

State

v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct, App.), cert, granted,
P.2d

(Utah 1989).
5.

Were the jurors properly instructed on the

definition of the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt?"

Jury

instructions must be construed as a whole and the trial court may
select any instruction that is in proper form, correctly states
the law and does not prejudice the defendant.
774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989).
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State v. Johnson,

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all dispositive constitutional and
statutory provisions is contained in the body of this brief or in
appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with second degree murder
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 9). A jury
convicted defendant of manslaughter, a second degree

felcm^fimmm

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) on August 18, 1989,
in Third District Court, Judge David Young presiding (R. 151).
Judge Young sentenced defendant to serve one to fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison on September 15, 1989 (R. 152).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 8, 1989, Grant Glover, his brother Dino, their
cousin, Larry Mosley, and friend Rodney Thomas went to the Caviar
Club where they stayed until closing time and then moved on to a
party at the Persepolis restaurant in downtown Salt Lake City (T.
91-92).

Grant Glover and Rodney Thomas were drunk (T. 96, 151).
Defendant, his wife, and three friends also attended

the party at the Persepolis (T. 190-91, 367, 372, 541-43).

While

they were dancing, defendant and his wife, Jacqueline Yazzie,
argued with Rodney Thomas and Grant Glover (T. 93-94, 144-45,
194-95, 378-80, 546-48).

The bouncer told Grant and Rodney to

leave the restaurant (T. 147). Afterward, defendant and his
friends left the restaurant by the back door (T. 198, 380, 548).
The four men, defendant, Terron Horton, John Bray and
Damion Duncan, drove Terron's car to defendant's apartment where
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defendant got out and went inside (T. 200, 385-86, 550). The
other three men planned to continue on to Damion's house where
they were going to retrieve a 12-gauge shotgun (T. 201, 384-85,
549-50).

According to John Bray, defendant was left at his home

to retrieve his pistol (T. 200). Defendant claimed that he
carried the pistol with him all evening in the waistband of his
pants and that he always carried a gun when he went to parties
because he had been threatened (T. 369-71, 424).
When Terrori was driving towards Damion's house, Damion
recalled that he did not have his keys to get into his house so
the three turned around and drove back to defendant's apartment
where defendant was standing outside (T. 201, 387, 549-50).
Defendant got into the car and all of the men returned to the
Persepolis (T. 202-04, 387-88, 550-52).

When they arrived at the

restaurant, Grant Glover and his friends were standing outside
(T. 210-11, 552). Defendant and his group went inside the
restaurant (T. 210-11, 389-91, 554). A few moments later,
defendant's group came back outside (T. 95, 210-11, 389-91, 554).
When defendant stepped outside, Grant Glover said some
things that implied he wanted to fight with defendant (T. 96,
214-16).

They were facing off when Grant said "If you've got any

beef[,] run up" (T. 114, 227). Meaning: if you've got a problem,
come on (T. 114, 227). Earl Tucker said something about two
gangs from California, Lynwood Crips and Compton CC's (T. 113114, 216). One of defendant's group, John Bray, wrapped a red
rag around his hand preparing to fight (T. 218). A red rag might
be interpreted to signify membership in the Bloods gang (T. 218-
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19, 402). A rival of the Crips (T. 216). Grant moved as if he
were reaching for something and defendant took his .25 caliber
pistol out of his pants pocket and fired (T. 226-27, 229, 404-05,
558).

John Bray described Grant's movement as "street

bluffing" —
90).

attempting to convince them he had a weapon (T. 289-

Grant Glover was unarmed (T. 608-10).

The bullet struck

Grant in the right eye (T. 325). Grant fell back and did not
move (T. 98).
After the shooting, defendant and his friends ran tb
defendant's apartment where defendant changed his clothes and
left the gun on the coffee table (T. 516). John Bray said that
defendant unloaded the pistol and disposed of the bullets (T.
235-36).

Defendant claimed that he did not unload it nor alter

the ammunition in any manner (T. 412, 500, 516). However, when
the gun was seized from defendant the following day, it was fully
loaded, thus supporting Bray's claim that the gun had been
unloaded and then reloaded (T. 312-13).
Grant Glover died in the hospital five days after he
was shot (T. 91, 341). The cause of death was the gunshot wound
to the head and resulting complications including swelling of the
brain and pneumonia (T. 331-32).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant waived any challenge he may have had to the
State's exercise of its peremptories because his objection came
after the jury was sworn.

Even if he did not waive the

objection, defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of
race discrimination in jury selection because he never
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established that the persons who he claims were prejudicially
stricken were, in fact, members of a minority group. Also,
defendant lacked standing to challenge the elimination of
Hispanics from his jury because he is Black.
The court properly excluded irrelevant evidence of who
threatened defendant and that they had firebombed his car since
defendant did not establish any connection between the persons
who allegedly committed these acts and the victim.

Defendant was

not prevented from presenting his theory of the case because he
testified that he had been threatened and that he carried a gun
because of it.
There was no prosecutorial misconduct that requires
reversal of this case.

Several of the claims made by defendant

were waived due to nonspecific objections or the lack of
objections.

Other claims do merit reversal either because the

matters were proper for jury consideration or because defendant
was not prejudiced by them.
The trial court properly admitted the gun that was
discovered inside a diaper bag that rested on a stroller that was
pushed by defendant and his companion when both were taken into
custody.

The search was contemporaneous to the arrests and was

justified as a search incident to arrest.
The jury was correctly instructed on the definition of
the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt."

The instructions given

by the court did not contain any of the language condemned by the
Utah Supreme Court in recent cases.

Even though the court

rejected defendant's proffered instruction, there was no error
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where the given instruction was proper and contained a correct
statement of the law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
Defendant claims that his conviction should be reversed
because the trial court incorrectly concluded that the prosecutor
had not exercised his peremptory jury challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner which violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution.

He asserts that he

established a prima facie case requiring the prosecutor to
explain his challenges and that the prosecutor's explanations
were not race-neutral as required by Batson v. Kentucky/ 476 U.S.
79 (1986).

This Court need not reach the issue of whether the

prosecutor provided sufficiently race-neutral explanations
because defendant did not properly preserve this issue below.
In Utah/ any challenge to the jury must be lodged
before the jury is sworn.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16 (Supp.

1990); State v. Bankhead# 727 P.2d 216/ 217 (Utah 1986). See
also/ People v. Harrisf 542 N.Y.S.2d 411 (A.D. 1989) (to be

Defendant also claims that the prosecutor violated Art., IV,
section 1 of the Utah Constitution by striking the two women
because they were women. This argument was not raised below and
should not be addressed. James v. Prestonf 746 P.2d 799, 801
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). The point is also not well-taken since 5
women sat on defendant's jury and the prosecutor also struck a
man from the panel. Defendant can show no prejudice from the use
of the State's peremptories to balance the gender mix of the
jury.
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jury, or the last juror including alternates, is sworn).

In this

case, defendant did not object to the prosecutor's exercise of
the State's peremptories until after the jury had been sworn (T.
74).

Thus, even though Judge Young heard the objection, his

rejection of it can be affirmed because the objection was
untimely.

State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)

(Appellate court may affirm rulings of lower court on any proper
ground) .
This Court may also affirm Judge Young's ruling because
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case.

Defendant did

not attempt to present any evidence supporting his claim of race
discrimination.

As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, under

Batson,
[t]he use of a peremptory challenge solely
on the basis of race violates equal
protection. The party attacking a peremptory
challenge must establish a prima facie case.
The burden then shifts to the challenged
party to show the existence of a racially
neutral reason for the challenge.
State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)("Cantu II").

And,

[t]o attack a peremptory challenge under
Batson, the defendant must establish a prima
facie case by showing (1) that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the
prosecution exercised peremptory challenges
to remove from the panel members of the
defendant's race, and (3) that all the
relevant facts and circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecution used its
peremptory challenges to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race.
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 581, 595 (Utah 1988)("Cantu I"). See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Judge Young did not find that defendant
had established a prima facie case under Batson when he invited
-8-

the prosecutor to respond to defendant's objection and, in fact,
defendant did not even attempt to establish a prima facie case.
Defendant simply alleged that the prosecutor appeared to have
stricken "the only two apparent or potential minorities on the
panel, [which] appears to be a systematic exclusion of minorities
. . ." (T. 75). This allegation does not satisfy defendant's
burden to establish "that the prosecution exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the panel members of the defendant's
race . . . ," Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595, for two reasons.
First, defendant did not establish that Ms. Gomez or
Ms. Resendez were members of any racial minority.

While their

names appear to be of Hispanic origin, defendant did not
recognize these people as being Hispanic when he raised an
earlier objection to the jury panel claiming that there were no
minorities on the panel (See T. 67). As defendant observed at
that time, either woman may have acquired her Hispanic-sounding
name through marriage or by some other means unrelated to her own
racial heritage.

Defendant did not present any evidence on this

question, nor attempt to present such evidence.

This Court

should not speculate about the eliminated jurors' racial heritage
absent evidence establishing it.

See United States v. Anqiulo,

847 F.2d 956, 985 n.38 (1st Cir. 1988)(failure to show eliminated
jurors with Italian/American surnames were, in fact,
Italian/Americans fatal to Sixth Amendment claim of fair crosssection violation).
Second, it remains an open question whether a defendant
has standing to assert a Batson challenge where the stricken
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Second, it remains an open question whether a defendant
has standing to assert a Batson challenge where the stricken
jurors are not members of the defendant's own race. While dicta
in Holland v. Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 803, 811-812, 813-814, 820-822
(1990)(Kennedy, J., concurring; Marshall, J,, dissenting; and
Stevens, J. dissenting), revealed that five members of the Court
believed such a defendant has standing, this question is squarely
presented in Powers v. Ohio, 110 S.Ct. 1109 (Feb. 20, 1990)
(granting certiorari).

See 46 CrL 3171 (1990).

Since one of the

five justices has now retired from the Court, it is not
conclusive that the vote would remain the same.
Other jurisdictions have held that a defendant lacks
standing to challenge the prosecutor striking jurors who are not
of his own racial heritage.

See e.g. United States v. Vaccaro,

816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Angiulo, 847
F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir.) cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 314 (1988);
United States v. Rodriguez-Cardenas, 866 F.2d 390 (11th Cir.
1989); United States v. Townsleyf 856 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir.
1988)(en banc); State v. Superior Court (Maricopa County), 157
Ariz. 541, 545, 760 P.2d 541, 545 (1988)(en banc); State v.
Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 552 A.2d 1203, 1209-10 (1989).

See also

Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1018 n.37 (1989); Note, Sixth Amendment
Reform of Peremptory Challenges —

State v. Superior Court, 157

Ariz. 541, 760 P.2d 541 (1988)(en banc), 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 327,
333 (1989).

For any or all of the reasons discussed above this

Court should reject defendant's claim.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PREVENT DEFENDANT
FROM PRESENTING HIS THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.
Defendant claims that the trial court prevented him
from presenting his defense by excluding his evidence of gang
violence and by not allowing him to read portions of the
preliminary hearing testimony to the jury.

According to

defendant, the trial court violated due process and denied him a
fair trial under the United States Constitution.

In a footnote

he also alleges, without analysis, that the Utah Constitution
affords him "extra protection along these lines" (App. Brief at
23, n. 14). This assertion should be ignored because it lacks
analysis and because it was not raised in the trial court.

State

v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Before trial, defendant moved for a ruling in limine
allowing him to present evidence that two months prior to the
shooting, defendant's car had been firebombed by a Tongan-Crip
gang (T. 356-357).

The responsible individuals allegedly ran up

to defendant's door and threatened his life on this occasion.
Judge Young denied the motion because the evidence was too remote
in terms of time, place and nexus to the shooting of Grant Glover
(T. 361). The court noted that the fact that Tongans may have
threatened defendant in February was not any reason for defendant
to have perceived danger from a Black person in April, at a
totally different location and under different circumstances.
Defendant did not establish that any of the Tongans allegedly
responsible for firebombing his car were present on the night he
shot Glover, nor did he establish that there was any connection
K^4-r.TMn tho Tnnoan orouo and Glover or Glover's companions (T.

356-63).

Defendant was allowed to testify at trial that he

carried a gun for protection because he had been threatened (T.
371).

Essentially, Judge Young excluded the evidence of who

threatened defendant and of the firebombing because it was
irrelevant.

Irrelevant evidence may be excluded by the trial

court which has considerable discretion to decide what is
relevant.

Bambrough v. Bethers# 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976).

Absent an abuse of discretion, the court's ruling should not be
disturbed.

Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314, 323 (Utah 1979).
Judge Young's decision not to admit evidence of the

Tongan firebombing, even if it was relevant evidence, was proper.
The trial court could also have excluded the evidence under Utah
R. Evid. 403.

See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah

1985)(Appellate court may affirm ruling of trial court on any
proper ground).

Rule 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule
403 will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

State v.

DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Cloud, 722
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986); and State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64
(Utah 1983).

Allowing this evidence would have confused or

misled the jury and could have prejudiced the outcome of the
case.

There was some danger that the jury would have focused on

whether the firebombing had occurred rather than upon the real
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issue of whether defendant committed the crime he was charged
with.

The jury may also have been confused and misled into

believing that there was some connection between the two
incidents even though defendant offered no proof of a connection.
Moreover, defendant was not denied the opportunity to
present his theory of the case.

Defendant testified that he

carried a weapon for protection whenever he went out because he
had been threatened (T. 371). During cross-examination, he
stated:

"after the things" that happened^ to me in the past I told

a friend of mine about what happened so I acquired the weapon for
protection." (T. 422). On direct examination, defendant also
testified that he carried the gun all night on the night he shot
Grant Glover and that he had returned to his apartment to change
his shoes rather than to retrieve his gun.

Thus, the jury heard

defendant's explanation of why he carried the gun and heard
defendant's claim that rather than returning home to get the gun
in the midst of the disagreement with Glover and his associates,
defendant had carried the gun with him all evening.

Defendant

was not prevented from presenting his theory and the trial court
did not err.
The trial court also did not err when it refused to
allow defendant to read a portion of John Bray's preliminary
hearing testimony to the jury.

During cross examination of Bray,

defense counsel attempted to impeach Bray with the preliminary
hearing transcript.

Counsel was unsuccessful in getting Bray to

agree that his testimony had been inconsistent at that
proceeding.

Counsel, however, believed that the testimony was
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inconsistent.

Rather than going over Bray's statements with him

line by line during examination, counsel sought to have the
testimony read to the jury after Bray had been excused from the
stand.

This was not the proper method of impeaching the witness

with his prior testimony.
Judge Young did not allow the testimony to be read to
the jury because he said that it appeared consistent rather than
inconsistent with Bray's trial testimony as defendant urgssL
When Bray's testimony at preliminary hearing on the issue of
whether defendant said he wanted to go get his gun is read in
context, it is confusing and difficult to comprehend.

However,

what Bray seemed to be saying at preliminary hearing was that
defendant never told him that he had gotten the gun when he
returned to the car rather than saying, as defendant claims, that
defendant never told him he was going to get the gun.

Because

the trial court has discretion in determining what evidence to
admit or exclude, there was no error in the court's refusal to
allow the transcript to be read to the jury.
P.2d 314, 323 (Utah 1979).

Terry v. ZCMI, 605

Rule 403 precluded the admission of

the evidence because it would have been unhelpful and confusing
to the jury.
POINT III
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
CROSS EXAMINATION OR CLOSING ARGUMENT.
The Utah Supreme Court delineated the test for
determining whether remarks by counsel constitute misconduct
which requires reversal in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah
1973).

The court said:
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The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and
[2] were they, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by those
remarks.
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426-

The court, in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d

483 (Utah 1984), further explained the second step of the Valdez
approach.
whole."

This step "involves a consideration of the caso**as~a

Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.

Specifically, the Court said

that,
if proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be
presumed prejudicial. State v. Seeger, 4
Or. App. 336, 479 P.2d 240 (1971). Likewise,
in a case with less compelling proof, this
Court will more closely scrutinize the
conduct.
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. The Utah Supreme Court has also long
recognized that "[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable
latitude in their arguments to the jury; they have a right to
discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and the
inferences and deductions arising therefrom."
513 P.2d at 426.

State v. Valdez,

See also State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 1255

(Utah 1988); State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975).
the Supreme Court said:
It is our opinion that it is not only the
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel,
to analyze all aspects of the evidence; and
this should include any pertinent statements
or deductions reasonably to be drawn
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In Kazda,

therefrom as to what the evidence is or is
not and what it does or does not show.
540 P.2d at 951. The comments by the prosecution in closing
argument in the present case fall within the Kazda rule.
Defendant's claims are discussed specifically below.
A.

MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Defendant claims that the prosecutor violated

defendant's privilege to prevent his wife from testifying against
him by asking questions of defendant about conversations with his
wife and by remarking in closing argument that it was interesting
that she was unavailable as a witness.

Before trial, the

prosecutor stipulated that defendant's marital privilege barred
the State from calling defendant's wife (Jacqueline Yazzie) to
testify against him.

The prosecutor noted, however, that the

State believed that it was not barred from referring to Ms.
Yazzie's statements or conversations occurring prior to her
marriage to defendant which occurred after the preliminary
hearing.

The marital privilege under Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1)

(1990) is twofold; the State cannot compel a spouse to testify
and marital communications are protected from questioning.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked
defendant when he married Yazzie (T. 420, 501). By asking this
question, the prosecutor did not impair or disparage either prong
of defendant's marital privilege.

The prosecutor proceeded by

asking defendant whether his wife had ever told police that Grant
Glover had a gun.

The following colloquy occurred:

Q You didn't tell Jacquie anything about the
other guy having a gun, did you?
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A Well, when I went to Damion's house and I
was talking to my wife, urn, I didn't really
talk to her really. I was just sitting
there.
Q

I take it that you mean no*

A

No.

Q You never told your wife about the other
guy having a gun.
A

Well, afterwards, yes.

Q When was the first time that you told
Jacquie that the other guy had a gun?
Ms. Loy: I will object to relevance, your
honor, unless it's tied into this time period
that is relevant.
Judge Young:

The objection's overruled.

The Witness:

The question?

Q (By Mr. Cope) When was the first time
that you told Jacquie that the other guy had
a gun?
A If I'm not mistaken I think I told her
either the morning after she came over after
the shooting or I told her the next day.
Q

Jacquie talked to the police, didn't she?

A

Yes, she did.

Q

And you read her statement, I suppose.

A

Yes, I have.

Q And you've talked to her about it, isn't
that right?
A

Talked to her about what?

Q

About what she told the police?

A

No.

Q

You haven't?

A

No.
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Q You haven't talked to your own wife about
what she told the police about the shooting?
A What about it? I told her I knew she had
talked to them. She went at the same time I
did.
Q Well, isn't it true that Jacqueline never,
at any time, divulged to the police—
[Defense counsel objected without specifying
why and Judge Young allowed the prosecutor to
finish his question.]
Q. Isn't it true that Jacqueline never at
any. time^- toXd the police that .the other man
had a gun?
[Defense counsel asked to approach the bench
and an unrecorded conversation occurred.]
(T. 501-503).

After defense counsel approached the bench, the

objection, whatever it was, was sustained (T. 503). Although the
objection to this question was sustained, the question does not
appear to be improper on the ground that defendant claims on
appeal, i.e. that it violated his marital privilege.

While the

prosecutor could not compel Ms. Yazzie to testify, he was not
precluded from asking defendant what defendant told his wife
about the crime or what he knew she had told police prior to the
marriage.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that

defendant objected to this line of questioning based upon marital
privilege.

His only objection during this exchange was on the

basis of relevance.
preserved.

His claim of misconduct was, therefore, not

State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984) (defendant

must have specifically stated to the trial court the same grounds
for objection to evidence he presents on appeal).
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Later, the prosecutor asked,
Q. When you talked to Jacqueline on the phone she
wanted to know what had happened, didn't she?
(T. 507). The prosecutor withdrew the question when defense
counsel objected stating that she thought the question violated
the marital

privilege (T. 507), but the prosecutor continued

asking questions about conversations with Yazzie without
objection (T. 507-509).

Defendant never sought a ruling from the

court that the,prosecutor had violated his marital privilege. Ho
doubt defendant recognized that only marital conversations, not
pre-marital conversations are protected by Utah Code Ann. § 7824-8 (1990).
Several courts in other jurisdictions have observed
that the marital communications privilege does not protect
communications between spouses which occurred before their
marriage.

State v. Howard, 756 P.2d 1324 (Wash. App. 1988);

State v. Dikstaal, 320 N.W. 2d 164, 166

(S.D. 1982); State v.

Thompson, 413 N.W. 2d 889 (Minn. App. 1987); People v. Devita,
517 N.Y.S. 2d 773, 774 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1987); State v. Williams,
650 P.2d 1202 (Ariz. 1982); VIII Wigmore, Evidence § 2335
(McNaughton rev. 1961); and McCormick, Evidence § 81 (2nd Ed.
1972).
Since defendant was not married to Jacqueline Yazzie
when they conversed by telephone following the shooting of Grant
Glover or when she was questioned by police, the questions did
not violate the marital privilege.

Further, these questions and

others were asked of defendant in an attempt to demonstrate that
when he talked to his friends immediately after the shooting, he
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did not tell them that Grant Glover had a gun.

The prosecutor

was trying to demonstrate that the notion of a gun in the
decedent's waistband was a newly formulated, hence arguably false
claim.

This was permissible in cross examination.

Thus,

defendant's claim that the prosecutor violated his marital
privilege during cross examination fails even if it was not
waived.
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor was guilty
of misconduct during closing argument, when he discussed the jury
instruction regarding the marital privilege.

The prosecutor

stated the following:
Instruction No. 10. This is a very
interesting one.
["]A married person may not be forced to
testify in any criminal action against
their spouse."
What's the assistance of that? Well, there
is a preliminary hearing of this matter on
the 17th of May and the defendant gets
married in July. And the trial is in August.
Isn't it interesting that one of the two
people who got told about the gun in the
waistband is the wife who can't testify?
(T. 639-640).

Although the trial court overruled defense

counsel's objection, this comment was improper.

In Utah, either

spouse may invoke the marital privilege against compelled
testimony in a criminal case.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1)

(1990); Utah Const, art. I, § 12.

In State v. Brown, 383 P.2d

930, 932 (Utah 1963), the prosecutor's comment to the jury, that
the defendant's wife, the one person who could have testified
that defendant was home at the time the assault occurred, did not
testify was prejudicial error.
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Later, in State v. Trusty, 502 P.2d 113 (Utah 1972),
the Utah Supreme Court observed,
that any comment by the prosecutor which
substantially impairs or disparages a claim
of privilege is improper and therefore is
error; and that if it be such that there is a
possibility that it prejudiced the defendant,
in the sense that there is any likelihood
that there may have been a different result,
then the error should be deemed prejudicial
and another trial granted. But the converse
is also true: unless both of those
propositions are affirmatively shown, there
should be no.such reversal.
Id. at 114.

In a footnote, the Court stated that the test is not

the intent of the prosecutor in making the comment, but whether
the comment was actually prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant.

Jd. at 114 n.3.
In the present case, the State concedes that the

prosecutor's comment "Isn't it interesting that one of the two
people who got told about the gun in the waistband is the wife
who can't testify?" was improper.

However, the comment was not

prejudicial because, as the prosecutor pointed out in the same
portion of his argument, another witness who was allegedly told
about the gun was also unavailable and there remains the fact
that none of the other eye witnesses testified that Grant Glover
had a gun.

To establish that the trial court committed

reversible error in this case when it overruled his objection to
the comment, defendant must demonstrate that there is a
reasonable likelihood that absent the comments the jury would
have returned a more favorable verdict.

Troy, 688 P.2d at 486;

State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting
State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984).
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The question is

whether the prosecutor's comment deprived defendant of a fair
trial.

Under the circumstances of this particular case, the jury

was not influenced by the remarks and defendant was not deprived
of a fair trial.
B. THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Next, defendant asserts that the prosecutor's questions
about his failure to mention, until he testified at trial, that
Grant \Glover had a gun in his hand when defendant shot him
violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
because it was a comment on post-arrest silence.
point is not well-taken.

Defendant's

When the prosecutor asked if defendant

had told the police about the gun, defendant objected to the
question "on the same grounds as previously made" (T. 506). The
only previous objection to a similar question was that it assumed
that defendant would entreat others to tell the police that there
was a gun (T. 505). That objection was sustained.

Defendant

cannot now claim on appeal that the real objection was that this
was a comment on post-arrest silence where that objection was not
made in the trial court.

State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah

1984) (defendant must have specifically objected in lower court
on same grounds raised on appeal).
Furthermore, this question would probably not have been
understood by the jury as a comment on post-arrest silence.

A

prosecutor commits error where a defendant does not testify only
if his comment was "manifestly intended or [is] of such character
that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount
to a comment on the failure of the accused to testify."
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State v.

Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Utah 1982) (quoting State v.
Nomeland, 581 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Utah 1978); and State v.
Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 137, 353 A.2d 190, 198 (1976)).

This

same principle should logically apply where the defendant does
testify.

Under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor

did not err.

Defendant admitted that he had spoken to several

people about the shooting and that he knew none of them had told
the police that Glover had a gun (T. 501, 502, 504-505, 508).
The jury most likely did not think anything about defendant
having invoked his right to remain silent since there was no
mention of him having done so and only testimony that he did
speak to several people about the shooting.
During closing argument, the prosecutor noted that the
State was not told by anyone prior to trial that Grant Glover had
a gun:
The most incredible story, the added detail
of the chrome plated revolver that he saw so
well from a distance of 15 feet sticking out
of the waistband of the dead man. Waistband?
Waistband? On a dark end street with some
back lit things from the Persepolis
restaurant? He's so sure he saw that that
he's willing to kill a man. No, that's an
added detail. He made that up later. He
never tells anybody about that.
(T. 647-648).

Defense counsel objected and "indicatfedj the

court's instruction upon his comments to remain silent" (T. 648).
Judge Young overruled defense counsel's objection because the
prosecutor was talking about the witness's testimony (T. 648).
The trial court also noted that by testifying, defendant had
waived his right against self-incrimination (T. 648). Defendant
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contends that the prosecutor's references to defendant's failure
to relate his exculpatory story before trial violated his right
to a fair trial.

Defendant relies on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610

(1976); Wainwriqht v. Greenfield, 475 U.S. 284, 292 (1986); State
v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981); and State v. Bartley, 784
P.2d 1231 (Utah App. 1989).
The United States Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), said, "We hold that the use for impeachment
purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after
receiving Miranda warnings, violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."

Id., at 619. The source of the

unfairness was the implicit assurance contained in Miranda
warnings that silence will carry no penalty.
However, Doyle is not applicable where, as here, the
record is silent about whether defendant ever invoked the right
to remain silent.

Since there is no evidence that defendant

remained silent, defendant's argument that the prosecutor
violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination by
asking him about the alleged gun is shaky at best.

Even if

defendant had invoked the right to remain silent when
interrogated by police, he did not remain silent when he spoke to
his wife and Renita Duncan about what happened.

As the court

ruled, the prosecutor was merely arguing the evidence when he
pointed out to the jury that defendant had not told others about
the gun and that Renita Duncan, who allegedly was told why
defendant shot Glover (T. 508) was not present to testify.
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In United States v. Aqeef 597 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1979),
the court said;
The Supreme Court has described [the right to
silence] as "the right to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will." The rationale
which the Supreme Court adopted for its
decision in Doyle was that it is
fundamentally unfair for the prosecution to
impose a penalty at trial on a defendant who
has exercised that right by choosing to
remain silent. The very statement of that
rationale demonstrates that Doyle can have no
application to a case in which the defendant
did not remain silent.
Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted).

Similarly, in State v. Velarde,

675 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that there
was no prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor asked
defendant on cross-examination why defendant had not told an
arresting officer what he testified to on direct examination.
Since there was an inconsistency between direct testimony and
what defendant told the officer, there was a legitimate basis for
prosecutor's testing the credibility of defendant by way of
impeachment, and defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment
guarantee to remain silent when he took the witness stand.

Id.

at 1195.
In the present case, the prosecutor's comment about
defendant not telling anybody about Grant Glover's undiscovered
gun was not evidence offered by the state in its case in chief as
confession by silence or evidence of guilt but rather a comment
as to why defendant had not told the same story to his friends
whom he admitted having spoken to, or if he did, why they did not
tell the police that Glover had a gun.

-25-

The comments went to the

credibility of defendant when he told a story on the witness
stand which added a detail previously unreported to the police by
any witness and were proper.
Additionally, defendant alleges that the prosecutor
violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination in the
following passage by stating that he failed to tell his side of
the story until trial:
Finally, Mr. Harrison said, yeah, that's
true. For the first time on the stand he
said'yep"/ I pulled the trigger. It was me.
What Detective Johnson has known, believed
all along, you have confirmed so easily. The
defendant said, yep, I pulled the trigger.
Well, why do we have to go through all that
work? Why do we have to bring in a doctor
and prove that Grant Glover was dead? Why
did we have to bring in a ballistics guy to
talk about the bullet? Why did we have to
have John Bray come in here and say my friend
shot him? Because until this man admitted it
we had the burden of proving it. We have to
be ready to prove it from the very beginning
of the trial, not the middle. And for that,
the State apologizes, but it's this
representative of the State's job to make
sure that everything possible is covered so
that there is no doubt and that that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is established from
the very beginning of the trial and not just
in the middle, because you see, the defendant
has no obligation to say anything at all.
(T. 634-635).

There was no objection to this argument at trial.

Where the defendant fails to object to the prosecutor's closing
arguments, he is precluded from claiming on appeal that the
argument was misconduct.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147

(Utah 1989); State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982).
Even if defendant had objected, this passage was an explanation
of the State's burden of proof and defendant's contrasting
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freedom from such a burden rather than a comment on post-arrest
silence.

It was not misconduct.

C. DEFENDANT'S REMAINING CLAIMS OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT DO NOT
MERIT REVERSAL.
In Points III C. and D., defendant asserts that there
were other questions and comments that constituted prosecutorial
misconduct.

Under the standards enunciated by Valdez and Troy,

none of defendant's remaining claims amount to reversible error.
The fact-that defense .counsel made a mistake in outlining 'ffflg
evidence she expected to present was something the jury had no
doubt already observed and were already wondering about.

The

jury was free to consider that defense counsel may have believed
that Glover wore a coat in which the gun was concealed because
that is the story defendant told to her.

It in no way violated

defendant's attorney-client privilege for the prosecutor to point
out her mistake.

Thus, the jury was not asked to consider

anything they were not justified in considering.
Similarly, the jury is free to speculate that a
defendant, who sits through the entire trial before testifying,
may alter his story to conform to the evidence after he hears the
evidence.

The prosecutor observing that fact is not engaging in

misconduct.
Furthermore, as defendant points out, the objection to
the prosecutor's explanation about why Earl Tucker and Rodney
Thomas were not called by the State was sustained.
obtained the relief he sought.

Defendant

He did not request that the jury

be further instructed about this issue nor request that they be
told to ignore the comment.

His claim that he was prejudiced is
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undermined by his failure to request any other remedy from the
court and is also undermined by the court's original instruction
that the arguments of counsel are not evidence as well as the
instruction to ignore matters where objections have been
sustained (R. 44)•
Finally, defendant did not object to the prosecutor's
argument regarding Instruction No. 27 which he claims for the
first time on appeal was improper.

His argument should be

disregarded because he failed to preserve the issue. Johnson/
774 P.2d at 1147; Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292.
POINT IV
THE GUN SEIZED FROM THE DIAPER BAG WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED AS THE PRODUCT OF A SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST.
On the day of the shooting, defendant and his
girlfriend were apprehended while walking down the street pushing
their two small children in a stroller (M.T. 19-20, 39-40, T.
2
302).
Both defendant and Yazzie were plac€>d under arrest. A
diaper bag located on the stroller, which the court found was
principally in the control of Yazzie (M.T. 59), was patted down
3
by one of the arresting officers at the scene of the arrest
after transporting defendant but prior to transporting Yazzie and
the children from the scene (T. 303-05).

At the time of the

o
"M.T." refers to the transcript of the hearing of the motion to
suppress dated August 8, 1989.
3
The arresting officer testified at trial on this issue although
she did not testify at the suppression hearing. This Court can
apply this knowledge to the determination of whether the trial
court's ruling was correct as the Court may affirm the ruling on
any proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985).
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arrest, both defendant and Yazzie were told to lie down on the
ground and both did so approximately 10 feet from the stroller
(M.T. 22). At the time of the pat-down, Yazzie was handcuffed
but had been moved closer to the stroller and was standing (T.
306).
42).

The bag was transported separately to the station (M.T.
At the station, an officer informed Det. Johnson that

something hard that felt like a gun was inside a zippered
compartment of the bag (M.T. 11, T. 305). Yazzie was placed in a
room with the bag and another officer (M.T. 13, 16-17).

Before

opening the zippered compartment, Det. Johnson asked Yazzie if he
could search the diaper bag (M.T. 15). Yazzie consented to the
search (M.T. 15, 59).
Defendant argued prior to trial that the bag was
unlawfully searched at the scene and that Yazzie's later consent
was given only because she perceived that it would have been
useless to deny permission to search the bag which defendant
claims had already been searched.

The trial court refused to

suppress the gun.
Arguably, the trial court ruled that defendant lacked
standing to object to the search of the diaper bag.

Both

defendant and Yazzie testified that the bag belonged to their
daughters rather than to them.

Defendant testified that he used

the bag when he changed the children's diapers.

Judge Young

found that the bag was "principally the property of Ms. Yazzie"
(M.T. 59). If the bag was the property of Ms. Yazzie, defendant
did not have standing to object to the search unless defendant
established some privacy interest in the bag and this Court need
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not consider any other basis for upholding the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress.

Rakas v. Illinois/ 439 U.S.

128, 131 n.l (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah
1984).

Judge Young did not articulate that he found defendant

had any privacy interest in the bag.

Therefore, this Court

should conclude that defendant lacked standing.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred
in admitting the gun based upon Yazzie's consent to the search
because he claims that the consent was involuntary.

His argument

centers upon his version of the facts in which he claims that the
arresting officer opened the zippered compartment at the scene,
that Yazzie witnessed this and that she believed there was no
point in refusing consent because the bag had already been
searched.

Defendant states that the arresting officer never

testified at trial that she did not open the zippered compartment
at the scene. App. Br. at 35 n.24. Thus, he appears to claim
that the officer must have opened the zipper.

The trial

testimony is not subject to the interpretation defendant wishes
to place upon it.

However, this point is meaningless because the

officer could have opened the zipper in a search incident to
4
arrest under the authorities cited below.
4

At trial Officer Ericka MacPherson testified that she could see
inside the open bag as it sat on the stroller (T. 303).
MacPherson looked inside the open compartment of the bag and felt
with her hand for anything that could be used as a weapon (T.
304). As she did so, she felt with the back of her hand
something hard and obviously shaped like a weapon in the separate
zippered compartment (T. 304). The dialogue continued:
Q

Were you able to see it?

A

No, it was zippered.
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In State v. Houserf 669 P.2d 437 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court approved a search of a backpack in the possession
of an arrested person incident to the arrest.

In this case, the

diaper bag was primarily in the possession of Jacqueline Yazzie
who was arrested at the time of the search.

Thus, the search was

proper as a search incident to arrest. Many courts have upheld
searches incident to arrest of closed containers in the
possession of the arrestee especially when the container is
immediately associated with the arrestee and where the arrest
occurred on a public street and the container is not going to be
left behind.

See generally LaFavef Search and Seizure § 5.5(a)

(2d ed. 1987).

The search in this case was constitutional as a

search incident to arrest and the trial court's ruling may be
upheld on this basis even though the court chose to base its
ruling on the subsequent consent.

State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257,

260 (Utah 1985) (appellate court may affirm ruling of trial court
4
Cont.
Q Okay. How did you determine that it was
in the shape of a weapon if you could not see
it?
A By the feel; by the shape of it. It's a
very thin plastic bag.
Q

And after you felt that what did you do?

A I immediately notified Lieutenant Tom
Brown who was at the scene and gave the bag
to him.
Q

Did you ever see the bag again?

A

No.

(T. 305). This passage clearly indicates that Officer
MacPherson did not open the zipper of the bag although she was
not expressly asked that question.
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on any proper ground).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON THE DEFINITION OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
rejecting defendant's reasonable doubt instruction.
Specifically, defendant complains that the court's instruction to
the jury was "circular and unhelpful" (Br. of App. at 40).
Further, defendant argues.vthat the trial court/s^instruction was
inadequate because it "left the jurors without concrete
understanding of the incomparable significance of their decision
to take another's freedom" (Br. of App. at 42).

Defendant's

position appears to be that the trial court was required to give
his instruction because he liked it language better than he liked
the instruction the court gave.

His position is without merit.

While the Utah Supreme Court has expressed concern
about including certain terms in reasonable doubt instructions,
the Court has never mandated that particular language be
included.

State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989);

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989) (concurring
opinions of J. Stewart and J. Zimmerman).

Instead, the standard

remains that jury instructions must be construed as a whole; and,
a conviction will be overturned only if a defendant can show that
he was prejudiced by the instruction such that the outcome of the
case would likely have been different.

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146

and 1149. Accord Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954) (reasonable doubt instruction may be misleading standing
alone, but acceptable when read as a whole with other jury
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instructions); United States v. Hallf 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th
Cir. 1988) (no constitutional infringement occurs where
instructions as a whole properly instructed the jury as to
defendant's presumption of innocence and the government's burden
of proof).
Further, it is the exclusive province of the trial
court to instruct the jury on relevant law.
Accordingly, the judge may, over the
objection of.the defendant's counsel, give
any instruction that is in proper form/
states the law correctly, and does not
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113
Ariz. 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976).
However, all instructions are subject to the
general and overreaching rule that the judge
must make it clear to the jury that the
defendant has "no particular burden of proof
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there
[is] any basis in the evidence from either
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
that the defendant [is] guilty of the
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695
(Utah 1980). . ..
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986).

As noted in

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, jury instructions must be construed as
a whole.

Here, the trial court fully and correctly instructed

the jury that the State must prove the allegations contained in
the Information beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 109, Instruction
No. 3 ) ; that the State carried the burden of proving all
essential elements of the crime charged (R. 124, Instruction No.
19); and that the jurors could find defendant guilty of
manslaughter, a lesser included offense, if the evidence
established the elements beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 126-127,
Instruction No. 21) along with the requisite intent (R. 129,
Instruction No. 23). Thus, the jury was instructed on numerous
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occasions that defendant bore no burden of proof and that it was
incumbent upon the State to establish defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Turning to the language of the reasonable doubt
instruction itself, the instruction was proper.

The trial court

instructed the jury that:
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proven.guilty.beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the
burden is upon the state to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require proof to an absolute certainty. Now
by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is
based on reason and is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable
doubt and not a doubt which is merely
fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it and obviates all
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt which reasonable men and women would
entertain, and it must arise from the
evidence or lack of evidence in this case.
(R, 112, Instruction No. 7). The first paragraph of this
instruction is not attacked by defendant as it is identical to
the first paragraph of defendant's requested instruction.

The

language is a correct and unequivocal statement of the
presumption of innocence.

See Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380.

The first line of the second paragraph is also identical to
defendant's requested instruction and merely restates that the
State has the burden of proof.
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The second sentence of the second paragraph: "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty," must be read with the fourth sentence: "It must be a
reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or
imaginary or based on wholly speculative possibility."

Together,

the language establishes, as recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court, that "a fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought
not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt."

Johnson, 774

P.2d at 1149 (concurring opinion of J. Stewart).
The third sentence of the second paragraph: "Now by
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence," is identical to
language used and approved of in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,
572 (Utah 1987).

It is also identical to the second sentence of

the second paragraph of defendant's proposed instruction (R. 91).
Defendant apparently finds some error in this language in the
given instruction because he underlined it in his brief at page
40.

He provided, however, no specific reason why this passage is

objectionable.
The first part of the fifth sentence, "Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. . .," is identical to that approved of
in Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572, and favorably reviewed in Johnson,
774 P.2d at 1145-1146.

The second part of the sentence, "and

obviates all reasonable doubt," is in conformity with Justice
Stewart's observation that "the instruction should specifically
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state the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt."
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (dissenting opinion of J. Stewart).
The last sentence of the instruction, "A reasonable doubt is a
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must
arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this
case," was approved in both Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572-573, and
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-46.
The trial court rejected the following instruction
proposed by defendant:
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
a defendant's guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he or she is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the
burden in upon the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that
is based on reason and one which is
reasonable in view of all the evidence. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable
men and women would entertain, and it must
arise from the evidence or the lack of
evidence in this case.
If, after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence in the case,
you can candidly say that you have the kind
of doubt which would cause a person to
hesitate to act, you have a reasonable doubt.
Deciding that someone has committed a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different
from making decisions concerning the more
weighty affairs of life. In such affairs of
life, a person looks forward and, based on a
degree of hope, determination and personal
resolve, makes a decision that involves a
degree of risk. However, this decision is
revocable or at least salvageable.
A decision to convict or not looks
backward. It is always irrevocable as to
your decision. It demands reason,
impartiality and common sense. You must have
a greater assurance of correctness of this
-36-

decision than you normally have in making the
weighty decisions in your life.
(R. 90-91).

The essential difference between defendant's

instruction and the given instruction is that defendant's
instruction includes language distinguishing between making
decisions concerning the more weighty affairs of life and a
decision to convict.

This view was articulated by Justice

Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Ireland/ 773 P.2d
1375,. 13a0 (Utah 1989), explaining his dislike, of the instruction
given in that case.
Defendant appears to contend that Justice Stewart's
disapproval of the "more weighty affairs of life" language,
previously included routinely in reasonable doubt instructions,
requires the trial court to explain to the jury that language
they have never heard should not be used to define the decision
they are about to make.

This position is indefensible.

Defendant's instruction is less illuminating than the instruction
given by the trial court.

It introduces to the jury language

which has been disapproved only to tell the jury not to apply it
to their deliberations.

Further, the "irrevocable" reference

might mislead the jury to conclude that the defendant is without
any remedy, such as a new trial, an appeal or parole.
"[T]here is no apparent reason to mandate that one, and
only one, particular instruction be used by trial judges in
conveying to the jury the meaning of the elusive phrase, 'proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
1980).

State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah

Taken as a whole, the court's instructions to the jury

placed the burden of proof on the State to prove all elements of
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the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The instructions were

sufficient and rejection of defendant's instruction was,
therefore, not error.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, 1149;

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-920 (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the evidentiary rulings of the lower court and to
affirm defendant's conviction.
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